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IDOLATRY AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
Richard Cross
Upholding a univocity theory of religious language does not entail idolatry, 
because nothing about univocity entails misidentifying God altogether — 
which is what idolatry amounts to. Upholders and opponents of univocity 
can agree on the object to which they are ascribing various attributes, even if 
they do not agree on the attributes themselves. Neither does the defender of 
univocity have to maintain that there is anything real really shared by God 
and creatures. Furthermore, even if much of language is analogous, syllo­
gistic argument—and hence theology's scientific status, as accepted by the 
scholastics — requires univocity.
1. A Theological Problem: Idolatry
The argument from univocity to idolatry crops up a lot in recent theologi­
cal literature. As Burrell nicely shows in "Creator / Creatures Relation," the 
argument is based on a theological intuition—about illegitimately import­
ing the creaturely into the divine realm—that has a long and distinguished 
theological history. For all that, the charge looks to be a mistake, seeming 
to rest on a confusion between two different ways of understanding the 
nature of a certain sort of theological error—specifically, on a confusion 
between two different ways of understanding that claim that God fails to 
have a certain attribute. The confusion is easily described. Let ^  be any 
alleged attribute proper to the God of the Abrahamic religions, such that 
creatures fail to be ^. Suppose the upholder of univocity wants to assert 
that God too fails to be ^ —as she will on occasion want to, since she be­
lieves that there are some words that can be predicated in the same sense 
of God and creatures. What she intends to claim is that the God of the 
Abrahamic religions is not ^. This may be a theological error, but it is not 
idolatry. The claim is de re—that the God of the Abrahamic religions is not 
^. To be guilty of idolatry, the theologian would at the very least need to 
understand the claim de dicto: that it is not the case that God is ^ —perhaps 
because a statue is God, or a tree is: genuinely idolatrous claims. But the 
de re assertion does not entail the de dicto one. So upholding univocity does 
not entail idolatry, because upholding univocity does not entail misidenti- 
fying God altogether—which I take it is what idolatry amounts to.
So the dispute between the upholder of univocity and her opponent is 
genuinely theological, and it is genuinely about one and the same God— 
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But setting aside the rather extrav­
agant rhetoric of idolatry, there is a substantive point to the opponent's
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riposte, and it is that the upholder of univocity makes a serious theological 
error, denying of the creator of the universe attributes which should be 
proper to him, and, by the same token, ascribing to him attributes which 
should be proper to his creation—thus blurring the distinction between 
creator and creature. Even thus described, it is not clear to me that the 
upholder of univocity is guilty. Typically, the upholder of univocity main­
tains that there are some words that we use of God and creatures that have 
the same meanings in these two applications. The two major medieval 
Christian protagonists in this debate, at least as presented in the modern 
literature, are Aquinas and Scotus, and these two theologians agree that 
meanings of words are concepts (I will return to this below). So the uni- 
vocity position amounts to the claim that there are some concepts under 
whose extension both God and creatures fall. Concepts are typically held 
by medieval theologians to be merely mental entities, and the defender of 
univocity does not generally accept that the view that there are concepts 
under whose extension both God and creatures fall entails that there is 
something extramental really common to, or shared by, God and crea­
tures. Now, some upholders of univocity may do this: Burrell cites Mary 
Beth Ingham's slightly ambiguous claim that there is "something common 
to God and the created order." Since Scotus believes that, in order to ac­
count for the fact that things of the same kind fall under the extension of 
some one species-concept, we need to posit some kind of common nature, 
really shared by things of that kind, it might be thought that he should 
generalize from this and claim that, to account for any case where things 
fall under the extension of some one concept, we need to posit some kind 
of real commonality between them. But there are clear counterexamples to 
this more general claim. For example, cats and dogs fall under the exten­
sion of the concept animal—but there is no reason to suppose that there 
is something real, animality, common to them. The concept animal is a 
vicious abstraction. Nothing is just an animal. Things are animals in virtue 
of being particular kinds of thing—cats and dogs, for example—and the 
fact that cats and dogs fall under the extension of the concept animal is 
explained simply by the fact that they are cats and dogs: anything which 
is a cat is an animal, and anything which is a dog is an animal. I will return 
below to the question of whether positing some real commonality entails 
undermining the distinction between God and creatures.
In fact, Scotus is clear throughout his discussions that he wants to claim 
no more than that there are concepts under whose extension both God and 
creatures fall—not that there are common real properties really shared by 
God and creatures. Still, this claim of conceptual commonality is itself the 
so-called "onto-theological" position that Burrell and others find so ob­
jectionable, the claim that allegedly undermines the distinction between 
God and creatures. It is not clear to me, however, that this assessment is 
correct. One common way of developing the argument is to make another 
assertion of idolatry: namely, that in positing some such concept—say be­
ing— the uni vocalist is idolatrously placing something real higher than 
God—namely, Being. But this is clearly misguided. Scotus, for example, 
is committed to no such thing. Concepts are not things in the real world, 
and there is no need to posit any real thing (such as a common nature 
or universal) other than the individuals realizing the concept. And this
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seems to refute the objection that univocity somehow undermines the dis­
tinction between God and creatures. God is not wholly unlike creatures, 
after all. But in positing the possibility of univocal concepts, a theologian 
is not ipso facto making God just another creature. The semantic theory is 
neutral on the question of the degree of real, ontological likeness between 
God and creatures. As it happens, Scotus accepts the traditional view that 
creatures imitate God by being, in their way, representations of him: God 
is the exemplar cause of creatures, and they are "measured" by him (see 
Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 2, q. un. [Vatican, 3:180]). This, presumably, al­
lows for univocity without an appeal to shared attributes common to God 
and creatures.
Perhaps the alleged problem is that accepting univocal concepts re­
quires accepting that God can somehow be grasped by the human intel- 
lect—and that this makes him less transcendent. I suppose we here bump 
up against apophaticism, and different senses of what it might be cogni­
tively to "grasp" God. I am sure that the univocalist would want to say of 
God what we understand that God is good, and more besides, and that the 
univocalist would not want to say that God is merely the "more besides," 
and none of what we understand of what goodness is—which I take it is 
the burden of the serious apophaticist. But apophaticism as serious as this 
is not theologically required in order to maintain the distinction between 
God and creatures. After all, everyone agrees that creatures resemble God 
in certain ways, and in order to maintain the distinction between God and 
creatures, it is not required that we be unable to specify any of the ways 
in which creatures resemble God. Neither is it required that we identify 
God with his own act of existence. There are plenty of other ways of iden­
tifying God as necessary and creatures as contingent—and this identifica­
tion seems sufficient for the relevant distinction—for "the Distinction," 
as Burrell puts it. Scotus himself takes pains to show just how his view is 
compatible with divine perfection—and, indeed, how opposing views are 
vulnerable to the objection that they diminish divine perfection, by deny­
ing that things that it is better to be than not to be—pure perfections—are 
in God. The argument is that we can find such perfections in creatures. If 
God fails to have them, then he fails to be wholly perfect. Since the perfec­
tions are the same, the concepts representing them must be univocal (see 
Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2 [Vatican, 3:25]). I will return to the no­
tions of the "same" perfections and "same" concepts below.
In fact, not even a more realist account of the properties had by God 
and creatures need undermine the distinction between God and the 
world. Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that we were to accept that 
there are universal properties shared between God and creatures. Would 
this make the property more absolute than God? Would the world of the 
creature somehow impinge on the divine world? On the first of these, the 
property would only be more absolute than God if we were to accept some 
kind of Platonic theory according to which universals are prior to the indi­
viduals that exemplify them. But this is a minority theory, I would judge; 
most philosophers who accept universals take the more Aristotelian line 
that universals are parasitic on individuals, and not vice versa. Neither 
would the view entail holding that the world of the creature somehow im­
pinges on God. We would not have to accept that the relevant universals
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are automatically creaturely; they could be wholly divine in their divine 
exemplifications and wholly creaturely in their creaturely exemplifica­
tions. Suppose that there were real genus-universals—animality, for ex­
ample, shared by cats and dogs. Asserting that the property is shared does 
not entail that something proper to cats is somehow impinging on the 
dog world, or vice versa. Something instantiated by cats is instantiated by 
dogs too. Considered in abstraction from its instantiation, we would need 
to say that animality is neither cat-like nor dog-like. Pari passu, consid­
ered in abstraction from its instantiation, any property shared by God and 
creatures is neither divine nor creaturely—though of course it needs to be 
realized in one or other of these (God or creatures): it is never instantiated 
without these, and neither are they instantiated without it. Still, I discuss 
this theoretically merely, because it is not clear to me that there are any 
theologians who consciously and deliberately accept this view.
2. A Philosophical Problem: Religious Language
Burrell makes a further and more general point, less theological, about the 
irresistably analogical nature of much of our language. As he puts it, "the 
shoe ends up on the other foot: it is univocal rather than analogical usage 
which requires explication." Well, a lot of this depends on one's general 
semantic theory, and this is not the place to enter into a discussion of such 
vexed territory. I will offer one small observation. No medieval thinker 
accepted anything other than what we might loosely label an "ideational" 
theory of meaning—meanings are ideas or concepts (whether concepts be 
understood as mental objects [of thought] or as mental acts [of thought]). 
Aquinas summarizes this as follows: "Words are signs of thoughts, and 
thoughts are likenesses of things" (Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 1). These 
thoughts or concepts are representations (Aquinas here calls them "like­
nesses") of things. They are distinct from the real properties and relations 
of which they are concepts, in the sense of being mental representations 
numerically distinct from the real items which they represent. But in so 
far as the concepts are representations of things, they convey informational 
content about the things they represent, and this informational content ex­
actly corresponds to the extramental properties or relations themselves. In 
this context, Aquinas talks about the res significata, the thing signified by 
a word (Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 3). When doing so, he wishes to draw 
attention to the fact that the relation between word, concept, and thing is 
such that, in virtue jointly of a word's signifying a concept and of a con­
cept's representing a thing, we can claim that the word signifies the thing 
too. So when Aquinas talks about the res significata, the thing signified, he 
means to talk both about the extramental perfection, and about the con­
cept representing that perfection. This is important, because Aquinas is 
happy to identify the meaning of a word predicated of 'God' and of 'crea­
tures' as one res significata (Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 3)—one concept, 
representing one perfection. Now, according to Aquinas's well-known 
teaching in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 5, words are used univocally when 
they signify identical conceptual contents—one ratio—and they are used 
equivocally when they signify many "totally distinct" rationes. Words are 
used analogically when they signify many rationes related by some kind
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of "community," "order," or "proportion." Since Aquinas identifies the 
meaning of a word predicated of 'God' and of 'creatures' as one res signifi- 
cata, the whole teaching seems to entail that one concept can include many 
related rationes: many related conceptual contents or meanings.
Views similar to this—though developed at greater length and in rather 
different directions—motivated Scotus to accept some requirement of uni- 
vocity in this context. Underlying Scotus's move is a very simple thought, 
elegantly expressed by Burrell:
if theologia is to be a scientia, then it must proceed by argument, and 
Socrates showed us that any responsible argument demands that the 
key terms "stand still"; they cannot be shifting meanings midstream, 
as it were. Fair enough.
Scotus states the thought thus:
I call that concept univocal which is one in such a way that its unity is 
sufficient for a contradiction when affirmed and denied of the same 
thing, and also is sufficient for a syllogistic middle term, such that the 
extremes are united in the middle term which is one in such a way that 
they can be united between themselves without the fallacy of equivo­
cation. (Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, n. 26 [Vatican, 3:18])
What worries Scotus is that the way of proceeding adopted by his oppo­
nents makes it impossible to give a philosophically accessible account of the 
individuation of concepts, and thus of the meanings of words. And with­
out an account of the "same" meaning, we cannot reason syllogistically. 
(I add "philosophically accessible" because we could insist not only that 
theological propositions but also the logical relations between them are 
revealed by God, and thus that we can individuate the relevant concepts 
on purely theological grounds; but I know of no thinker who would hold 
this.) On the contrary, Scotus insists, we believe that theology is scientific, 
and if we believe this, then in turn we ought epistemically to accept that 
that the words it uses have the same meanings. But notions of the same 
meaning (the same ratio) themselves become meaningless in an account 
that can allow one and the same concept (res significata) to embrace dif­
ferent meanings or different conceptual contents (rationes)—at least if it 
be thought, as it is on the accepted ideational theory of meaning, that the 
meanings of words just are concepts of the sort alluded to. What Scotus's 
account shows is that, at the very least, given an ideational theory such as 
that which both he and Aquinas accept, scientific argumentation requires 
univocity: the notion here that meanings, conceptual contents, and con­
cepts all coincide. If we were to accept, for example, a "meaning-as-use" 
kind of semantic theory, the position might be very different: the notion 
of univocity might, indeed, lose all purchase, much as Burrell suggests. 
But Burrell's argument is primarily historical, and so too is mine. Note 
that none of this requires that we deny that much language is irresistibly 
analogical, much as Burrell maintains. But Scotus's point is that there are 
still significant theological loci where univocity is required, at least on the 
semantic theory accepted by him and Aquinas.
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Still, perhaps the medievals were wrong to think of theology as in any 
sense sdentific—indeed, wrong to think of it even as a domain in which 
the use of syllogistic reasoning is permissible. But Scotus has another, 
more general concern, also expressed in the passage just quoted. Unless 
the meanings of the words are exactly the same, then certain apparent 
theological contradictions turn out not be such. Scotus gives a well-known 
and very elegant example:
Every intellect that is certain of one concept and doubtful about oth­
ers has a concept of which it is certain other than the concepts about 
which it is doubtful. . . . But the intellect of a wayfarer can be certain 
that God is a being while doubtful whether he is a finite or an infinite 
being, or created or uncreated. . . . For every philosopher was certain 
that that which he posited to be the first principle was a being (for 
example, one that fire was a being, and another that water was). But 
he was certain neither that it was first (for then he would have been 
certain of something false, and the false cannot be known), nor that 
it was not first (for then he would not have posited the opposite). 
(Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, nn. 27, 29 [Vatican, 3:18-19])
What Scotus is claiming is that, if "God is a finite being" and "God is an 
infinite being" are contradictories, then 'being' is used univocally in the 
two cases. This looks plausible, and is sufficient to establish that there are 
some concepts—here, being—under whose extension both God and crea­
tures fall ('finite being,' after all, is not obviously meaningless). It is worth 
keeping in mind that Aquinas himself accepts that univocity is required 
for the possibility of contradiction. At one point, he wonders whether or 
not the term 'God' is said univocally in the following two cases: "This idol 
is God" (uttered by an idolater), and "This same idol is not God" (uttered 
by a Catholic). Aquinas concludes that it is, and thus holds that the idola­
ter goes wrong because he understands the sense of the word 'God,' but 
predicates it of something that could not be God:
Whence it is clear that the Catholic, saying that the idol is not God, 
contradicts the pagan who asserts that it is, because both use this 
name 'God' to signify the true God. (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q.
13, a. 10 ad 1)
Aquinas goes on to note in the same passage that when the Catholic truly 
says of the same idol "This idol is (a) god," 'God' is then used homony­
mously with its use in the Catholic's utterance "This idol is not God." So 
univocity is required for contradictoriness.
I will return to a possible Thomist response to Scotus's argument in a 
moment. But first, I want to dispose of a specious objection. It could be ar­
gued that the two claims are not contradictory because the two claimants 
might simply be talking about different objects altogether. This would be 
possible on the de dicto readings of the two claims: person a claims that 
God is an infinite being, and person b that it is not the case that God is an 
infinite being. In this case, person a and person b do not agree on the ref­
erence of 'God,' and so do not necessarily, or unambiguously, contradict
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each other. But Scotus clearly has in mind the de re readings: the thing that 
is God is a finite being, or the thing that is God is an infinite being. Thus, 
person a claims of God that it is a finite being; person b claims of God that 
it is an infinite being. These de re claims are certainly contradictory, and the 
possibility that our two claimants can contradict each other seems to allow 
that being is univocal.
So what could Aquinas say in response? Fundamentally, given that he 
accepts that univocity is required for contradictoriness, and given that he 
denies that 'being,' predicated of God and creatures, is univocal, he would 
be constrained to deny that the two disputants in Scotus's example con­
tradict each other. He will say instead that at least one of them is uttering 
something meaningless. If 'being' means "existence proper to creatures," 
then there are no infinite beings; if 'being' means "existence proper to 
God," then there are no finite beings. In the first sense, the claim that there 
is an infinite being is meaningless; in the second, the claim that there is 
a finite being is meaningless. Aquinas, in short, would deny that, if 'be­
ing' must be understood univocally, then anyone legitimately enquires 
whether God is a finite being or an infinite being. In short, the two protag­
onists do not contradict each other at all. We cannot legitimately make the 
Scotist enquiry, so we cannot conclude therefrom that 'being' is univocal. 
But we can certainly agree that contradictoriness is sufficient for univocity. 
Aquinas's denial of univocity in this context is not incoherent. But it can 
be seen on closer inspection to be counterintuitive; this attempted defense 
was an argument made up after the fact to support a position arrived at 
on quite different grounds.
I am not here defending a particular view of theological language. I 
am certainly not asserting that such language needs to be univocal. I am 
asserting that, given certain semantic and methodological assumptions 
made conspicuously by some medieval theologians, including Aquinas, 
univocity turns out to be required for all sorts of discourse, and partic­
ularly for theological discourse. It seems, then, that the question of the 
distinction between philosophical theology and philosophy of religion is 
one that needs to be decided not on theological grounds—in terms of a 
(specious) charge of idolatry—but on philosophical grounds: in terms of 
an evaluation of various rival semantic theories. And this is not likely to 
be an easy task, or one that is settled quickly—theories of concepts are as 
contested as ever, and there is by no means an established consensus on 
the matter.1
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NOTE
1. I develop some of the material in this essay in much more detail in 
my article "Univocity and Mystery," in Metaphysics as Scientia Transcendens, 
ed. Roberto Hofmeister Pich and Jakob Hans Schneider (Louvain-la-Neuve: 
FIDEM, 2007).
